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The specifics of the latest fatality of a Metro worker are unclear and I don't want to speculate about cause.

The report of another failure of an ATP component is noteworthy. This is the second published report of a failure of a vital piece of ATP equipment prior to the Ft. Totten accident.

In the latest incident reported at Potomac Ave, the train was stopped by the operator within 500 feet of another train (1200 feet is the absolute limit). In the 2005 Foggy Bottom incident, one train stopped within 35 feet of another and another trailing train stopped within 12 feet of the 2nd train.

All three failures (including the Ft. Totten accident) were apparently by different components. WMATA notes this and stresses these are very different circumstances than the Ft. Totten accident. This misses the point entirely and indicates that WMATA management still does not grasp the severity of the situation.

If these near misses had been analyzed and acted on, we would perhaps have a redundant ATP system or be well on our way toward installing one. Instead, WMATA is scrambling now to figure out what type of system to install as a result of the fatal accident.

There is not a component built that will never fail--hence the need for redundancy. Those who have failed to grasp this as a result of previous incidents need to be accountable for their error in judgment.

by kreeggo on Aug 10, 2009 11:11 am • link • report