Posts by Dave Stroup

Over the course of the last two months, I have had the opportunity to sit down with both Biddle and Shapiro to discuss their respective campaigns. Biddle, who briefly held the at-large seat before losing in last April's special election, has simply not been able to put together a persuasive campaign.

During Biddle's last attempt, he proved unable to articulate a clear vision for DC and energize voters around his ideas. His campaign was also dragged down by endorsements from most of the DC political establishment at the same time the Sulaimon Brown and Navigator-gate scandals were breaking.

Biddle, to his credit, holds positions that are favorable to most progressives. He would be a solid vote in favor of many things we'd like to see, including stronger ethics and campaign finance rules. Unfortunately for Biddle, his campaign is mired with low fundraising numbers and internal problems. Recently, Biddle announced via email that his campaign manager—the former leader of the DC Republican Party—had departed.

He also still has not demonstrated a clear vision or solid positions, leaving potential supporters concerned he would repeat the mistakes of the last campaign. These factors, plus his tepid third place finish last April, show that he simply isn't positioned to defeat Orange.

Thankfully, Peter Shapiro provides an equally strong progressive candidacy, combined with fundraising and organizational prowess. Shapiro, who grew up in the District, served on the Prince George's County Council in Maryland before moving back to the District with his wife. Shapiro brings to this race years of experience both as a legislator, but also as an environmental activist and organizer.

Shapiro was tapped to join an ethics task force in Prince George's County, created in the wake of former county executive Jack Johnson's arrest on corruption charges. This experience gives Shapiro credentials for helping restore trust in the DC Council. Presently, Shapiro lives in Ward 4 and runs the Chesapeake Center for Public Leadership.

In a three-way race with 2 progressive candidates, Orange would very likely cruise to victory. While I don't doubt Biddle's commitment to improving the District, he has been unable to build a campaign that can win. It's time for Biddle to put the good of DC ahead of his own ambition, withdraw from the race, and support his fellow progressive.

Note: This is not an official endorsement in this race. Greater Greater Washington is an opinion site, and unless specifically designated as an endorsement, opinions posted here are the opinions of their individual authors and not necessarily of the site's editors or other contributors. We will likely post an official endorsement at a later point in the campaign.

Kuller states, "But it's a mistake to have a youth engagement event in this area. The police have tried to disperse the crowds in London, too. If you don't think that can happen in the US, you're wrong."

The Chinatown area has been the focus of concern regarding youth violence for some time. It is an area where kids of all ages gather, especially kids who may have nowhere else to go, and nothing else to do. It's a vibrant area with places that are open late and places that, unlike Proof, are affordable to people from all incomes.

There are issues with loitering. There are issues with violence. However, as another article by Klopott in the same issue of the Examiner notes, the District has made progress in reducing violent crime.

DC should be applauded for creating events such as this in hopes to give kids with nowhere else to go something productive to do. For too long we've focused only on treating the symptoms—breaking up crowds of kids, installing noise-making devices to discourage loitering. To engage these kids is a positive step forward.

The article also notes that business owners received little notice and several streets will be closed. Kuller is concerned that the crowds will impact his outdoor patrons' ability to enjoy their dinner. That's possible, and perhaps the program could have been communicated better, but there are often crowds in the area, and bad weather can also affect the patio.

More importantly, it is disappointing to see a local business owner decide that his patio seating for one Friday night is more important that engaging the children who are the future of this city. This is the precise attitude that makes it so very difficult to solve the complex problems our city faces.

It's so much easier to dismiss the children of our city as a violent mob-in-waiting. It's so much easier to waive your hand and say "please, not here." It's harder to say, "let's engage our children. Let's address the fact that these kids have nowhere else to go."

It is also upsetting, but not surprising, to see the Examiner engage in such fear-mongering. I am aware that the editors often write the headlines, but I can't excuse the entire tone of this article as being the act of editors. I am extremely disappointed with Mr. Klopott for his lack of understanding and sensitivity.

I also understand that Mr. Kuller is concerned about his business on a busy Friday night. However, I have a feeling that Mr. Kuller's business will suffer more when his customers are greeted by a crowd of citizens of the District who explain just why Proof should not be patronized.

As such, I invite you to join myself and other concerned citizens outside of the MLK Library at 9th and G St. NW, Friday evening at 5:45. Dress as if you are going to dine at Proof for the evening. We will have fliers to distribute to customers who are entering the restaurant. All we are saying is that it is inexcusable for a business owner in the District of Columbia to so easily dismiss the future generation of Washingtonians as people not worthy of engagement but merely a group of thugs waiting to set the city on fire.

That is not okay. That is not how we make our city a better place.

Update: Last night, Mr. Kuller posted a response regarding his comments in the Examiner. Mr. Kuller asserted that he does not believe London-like riots are likely, and that his quote was misinterpreted. It is disappointing that the Examiner sensationalized Mr. Kuller's comments, aiming to provoke a reaction of fear among readers.

As a result of the conversation that has grown out of this post, it was decided that the planned boycott of Proof this evening would likely not be fruitful and will not go forward.

Gray is an experienced politician and also a bit of a policy wonk. The first impression you get is that he knows what is going on, and that he doesn't always need to fall back on talking points. It is obvious that Gray is running a campaign aimed directly at people who have felt left behind by Fenty. Gray stresses that he is a uniter, and that he wants to be the mayor of "all of the people, not just some of the people." He aims to bridge the divide between rich and poor, Northwest and Southeast. He feels too many people have been left behind, and that too many people don't feel invested in the city.

To achieve these goals of unity, Gray is pushing his birth-to-24 education plan. He wants better education for all ages, both to help adults get better jobs and college degrees and to keep young families in the District. His plan, which was released last week, is lofty. He again stressed that he won't answer if he'd keep Michelle Rhee on board, even if she has made it clear she would not stay. He wants reform that is institutionalized, and he wants to get the public more involved.

On a similar note, he would also not commit either way on the future of MPD Chief Cathy Lanier. Overall, Gray has been pleased with her performance, but was very careful to be non-committal. Given his recent endorsement by the police union, this was unsurprising.

Gray also took some time to talk about development and inclusionary zoning. He made it a point that he had been at the front end of that push, and as mayor he would "aggressively implement" inclusionary zoning. This was one of the few points on which Gray hit directly at Fenty, noting his delays have caused lost units. Gray also noted that he supports making rent control permanent. When discussing development, Gray wants to see more expansion of economic diversity in developments, but without such significant displacement. A key part of his plan would be to relocate people nearby during construction, to give them a realistic chance of returning.

During the meeting, Gray was reluctant to take personal swipes at Fenty. He would note areas where Fenty's policies had failed, but it was often his campaign manager Adam Rubinson who would chime in with a more direct attack. Gray's style is moderate and low-key. He knows how government works, and he has some very idealistic plans. His campaign is building a solid alternative to Fenty, but the political calculus in the District is complex. Gray has the support of many who dislike Fenty, but he also needs to attract those on the fence. Gray acknowledges the intensity of the campaign, but did not have a solid answer when asked how he can attract people who are happy with a lot of Fenty's accomplishments.

Gray's campaign can be summed up mostly as providing more opportunities. This includes education, housing, health care and employment. He wants more government transparency and pledges to hold weekly press conferences. I don't think you'd find anyone in the District who would disagree with his platform at this point.

Any skilled candidate will provide thoughtful and compelling answers at a session such as this. The real questions are always in the nitty-gritty. There's no doubt that Vincent Gray loves the District and wants to see things change for the better. This campaign will be won or lost on Gray's ability to convince District voters that he can make these things happen. The wisest thing Gray said on Monday was that this campaign will not come down to who has the most money. Fenty has a large war chest, and a record of results. He also has vulnerabilities. This will be an extremely close race, and it will be interesting to see whether the idealistic campaign plan of Vincent Gray can weather the long, hot DC summer.

Cross-posted at We Love DC.

While the inconvenience is only temporary, it calls into question the Zoo's interest in being a good neighbor to those on the east side of the park. By closing the Harvard Street bridge, the Zoo not only cut off pedestrian access, but also to the jogging and bike trail.

The bike lane on Harvard Street directs cyclists to use the Zoo's bridge to connect to the trail in Rock Creek, but even under normal conditions that bridge is closed whenever the Zoo is closed. As a result, residents on the east side of the park must go all the way through Adams Morgan and cross Rock Creek via Calvert Street. The other option is going north to Klingle Road, and then going across via Porter Street.

Adding a connection somewhere in the middle, that is not dependent on Zoo hours, would solve this problem. Reader John C. suggests a bike and pedestrian bridge connecting Mount Pleasant to Jewett Road, a street that travels the perimeter of the Zoo. Jewett Road currently has no pedestrian access, and is only open during Zoo hours. A bike and jogging path alongside Jewett Road would let pedestrians and cyclists easily travel from Mount Pleasant to the Rock Creek Trail, or to the businesses on Connecticut Avenue in Cleveland Park. This would involve cooperation from the Zoo, but would prove a great benefit to the community.

The east side gate to the Zoo is only 0.7 miles from the Columbia Heights Metro, and is within walking distance of many growing neighborhoods. The Zoo should take more interest in encouraging people who live nearby to visit by foot.

Presently, the DC Circulator advertises that it goes to the zoo, via its stop in Woodley Park. Interestingly enough, the Circulator's westbound stop at 16th and Columbia is only 0.5 miles from the eastern gate, while the stop at Woodley Park is 0.4 miles from the main gate on Connecticut. There are plenty of options out there to make the Zoo more a part of neighborhoods both to the east and the west.

After hearing about the closure of the Harvard Street bridge, Councilmember Jim Graham (D-Ward 1) asked Zoo officials about the construction project, and if the end result would be more pedestrian friendly. The Zoo responded noting the addition of the shuttle bus service, as well as the temporary signage at the closed bridge.
Debra Nauta-Rodriguez, the acting executive officer of the Zoo, has promised Graham a further response to these concerns.

Dougherty joined Muni last year, under similar circumstances. The agency has a ridership of around 700,000 daily, and operates light rail, bus, trolleys and cable cars. Muni hired Dougherty amid a campaign to crack down on safety, following a significant increase in accidents involving Muni vehicles.

During his tenure, Muni continued to suffer a string of accidents. To his credit, Dougherty began to implement changes, hoping to instill a better culture of safety within the agency. Since his tenure was less than a year, though, it is difficult to determine what impact he made. According to SF Muni, safety incidents declined during his employment, despite several high profile accidents.

Dougherty's emphasis on safety, as well as his understanding that a culture of safety is important are encouraging. His prior tenure was at an agency that had eerily similar problems as Metro. This piece about Muni safety in 2009 reads as though it could have been about Metro:

Georgetta Gregory, who manages the consumer protection and safety division of the California Public Utilities Commission, told the supervisors that Muni has made "substantial accomplishments" in the past three years.

"SFMTA has recognized the urgency of promoting a safety culture," she said. That includes encouraging Muni employees to report safety issues "without fear of reprisal," she said.

Gregory highlighted improvements to Muni track conditions and record keeping, quicker completion of accident investigations, and safety improvements such as cameras in buses and signal improvements at 4th and King streets, the site of another light-rail injury crash in June 2008.

Gregory said she has assigned three full-time engineers to oversee Muni safety operations, in contrast to the one engineer that is normally assigned to each transit agency.

"Three years ago to today, it is a stark improvement," Gregory said.

Other recent safety improvements include the addition of more Muni street supervisors, retraining for drivers, and public safety campaigns, Dougherty noted.

We can hope that Dougherty took the job with Metro with the hopes that he can build on his experience at Muni, and not because he was discouraged at the difficulties involved in instilling institutional change. Many of the concerns riders have in San Francisco echo those in DC, especially regarding employee discipline.

At this point it may be too early to tell if this choice will finally cement safety as a high priority at Metro. A recent Washington Post poll showed riders are mostly confident in Metro's safety, but history and recent events show there is still work to be done.

The NTSB issued a series of recommendations dealing with the specific circumstances surrounding this crash. However, the organizational concerns would be harder to address. Ultimately, none of the individual failures that occurred on January should have resulted in a collision. Rather, a lack of coherent procedures and an established atmosphere of safety allowed these failures to compound, resulting in a serious accident. From the NTSB report:

The Safety Board found WMATA management policies and methods to be inconsistent with the needs of a technically complex automated rail system. Systematic analyses of organizational processes reveal that managers operating highly automated systems must successfully contend with unique demands presented by the automation itself. One fundamental requirement for managing automated systems is to contend effectively with "tight coupling" between different operating elements in the system. That is, in organizations operating highly technical automated systems, decisions that affect one activity in the organization will probably affect other activities and will sometimes produce unanticipated hazards.

High-technology organizations must also be capable of both centralized and decentralized control. Operating activities need to be controlled within "tightly prescribed steps and invariant sequences," thereby ensuring that actions suitable in one circumstance or departmental area do not conflict with other activities in the system. At the same time, operating personnel occasionally have to be able to take "independent and sometimes…creative actions" in order to prevent the development of unsafe conditions. Finally, high-technology organizations must have safeguards to prevent unsafe conditions that may result when the automation compensates temporarily for deficient operation and then fails to protect the system when unforeseen factors combine and breach the system's safeguards. This condition poses the greatest threat to the safety of a complex system and must be addressed in well conceived system planning.

Given the extent to which WMATA executive management was found to depart from these essential organizational characteristics, it is not surprising that flawed decisions, inadequate or ambiguous train control procedures, and poorly understood or unenforced rules had proliferated.

While Metro may have responded with targeted fixes to the immediate problems, the 1996 accident would not prove to be a catalyst for widespread safety improvements. As noted in the previous installments, time and again similar concerns would be echoed by the NTSB and other observers.

On November 3, 2004 at 12:49 pm, an out-of-service Red Line train rolled backwards into the Woodley Park station, striking an in-service train that was servicing the platform. Twenty people were injured in the incident. The NTSB would identify the cause of the crash as a lack of rollback technology, coupled with a lack of attentiveness on the part of the operator of the out-of-service train. This lack of attentiveness would be attributed to a lack of proper time off between shifts. Had this accident occurred with two fully-loaded trains, the casualty count would have been much greater. Concern persists to this day within Metrorail about operators not having enough time off between shifts for adequate rest.

The NTSB report for this incident also once again raises questions about Metro's organizational structure. The NTSB notes that Metro had made improvements following the 1996 crash, but that some of those changes were short lived:

WMATA's organizational structure was not an issue in the November 3, 2004, accident at the Woodley Park station. However, following the 2004 accident, WMATA restructured its organization again, reverting back to the safety department having a disconnected responsibility and accountability reporting chain. In effect, this restructuring maneuver rescinded the direct reporting link between the safety department and the GM that had been established as result of the Shady Grove accident. This post accident reorganization could recreate the systemic information isolation that existed within WMATA prior to the Shady Grove accident, which in turn could inhibit serious safety problems from being identified or adequately addressed.

The NTSB would direct the Federal Transit Administration to assess Metro's organizational structure, with safety recommendation R-06-04. This recommendation was marked as Closed-Acceptable Action in 2007. On July 14, 2009, Peter M. Rogoff, the FTA administrator, testified before a House subcommittee regarding the June 22, 2009 crash. In his testimony, Rogoff discussed R-06-04 as well as some more recent developments within Metro. From his testimony:

The FTA has conducted several SSO program audits of TOC since Part 659 went into effect on January 1, 1997. The most recent audit was conducted in October 2007. Previous audits took place in 2000 and 2005. FTA also conducted a Safety Review in 1997. The 2007 audit was conducted as part of FTA's three-year audit cycle for all 27 SSO agencies in the audit program. During this audit, while on-site at TOC and WMATA, FTA also reviewed the progress made by TOC and WMATA to address two findings that were still open from FTA's 2005 SSO Program audit of TOC. In addition, FTA used this opportunity to assess WMATA's response to Safety Recommendation R-06-4 from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which addressed the adequacy of WMATA's organizational structure and its ability to effectively identify safety issues. Prior to the Woodley Park-Zoo accident, the WMATA Safety Department reported to the General Manager through a Deputy. Shortly after, WMATA changed its organization so that the Chief Safety Officer and head of System Safety and Risk Management (SSRM) was a direct report to the General Manager. NTSB correspondingly classified this recommendation as "Closed – Acceptable Action".

However, in recent months, WMATA has re-organized the Chief Safety Officer position to report to the Chief Administrative Officer, who reports to the General Manager. FTA asked the TOC to follow up with WMATA. WMATA has assured the TOC that the organizational changes do not adversely affect safety and that the "visibility and importance of the safety department will not diminish". FTA continues to view the NTSB recommendation as a sound safety model and the current structure at WMATA causes us concern.

The 2006 Woodley Park crash illustrated, in a very vivid way, the potential for the catastrophic structural failure of Metro's railcars in a collision. This has become the legacy of the incident, and less attention has been paid to the problem of operator attentiveness. The NTSB noted "the low task demands and unremarkable operating environment during the accident trip were conducive to the train operator becoming disengaged from some critical train operations." This is a good example of multiple causes compounding to result in a serious incident.

To be clear, the prior collisions on the Red Line were not caused directly by problems with the Automatic Train Control system. The direct causes of both the 1996 and 2004 collisions were identified by the NTSB, and steps were taken by Metro to avoid re-occurrence. As discussed previously, Metro does have a good track record of addressing very targeted safety recommendations. It is very unlikely that the specific set of circumstances that caused the 1996 or 2004 collisions will happen again on Metro. However, that is not the larger issue. As the NTSB identified, there are organizational problems at play, problems that seem to be difficult for Metro to resolve.

The common thread that has emerged in this series is Metro's reactive, rather than proactive stance on safety. Time and again there have been indicators that safety is not always the highest priority within the organization. The NTSB identified this as a problem, both in 1996 and again in 2004. In the wake of the 2009 crash, the Federal Transit Administration testified about continued concerns regarding Metro's organizational structure. The fact that the safety department has been "overhauled" many times since the 1996 incident underscores the problem. A safety department that is in flux and experiences turnover at the highest level will likely not be able to instill the kind of work culture that is required for a complex organization.

In Part IV of this series, we will look more closely at the concept of a culture of safety.

Warnings about other causes of derailments, such as a lack of track lubrication were also ignored. Investigators determined a lack of lubrication caused a derailment at the Alexandria rail yard. There was a brief push towards getting track properly lubricated, but over time the efforts began to falter. Don Painter, former manager of the track department, told the Post that he blamed a lack of institutional memory. "The superintendent retired, the assistant superintendent went to a different location, the maintenance manager went somewhere else, and the guys, when no one told them they needed to keep lubricating, the ball got dropped."

It took a year and several derailments later for Metro to implement directives regarding track lubrication.

Metro's track department was rife with systemic problems, especially concerning track inspections. The Post's investigation turned up a 2004 audit that showed some track workers did not know how to report problems to their superiors, and that inspectors often overlooked problems because they were required to cover an unrealistic amount of track each day. Additionally, prior to 1999 there was no official training program for track walkers, and audits showed that even after programs were implemented there was a lack of proper training.

In 2005, Susan Coughlin, a former NTSB member, noted that these incidents were "indicative of systematic oversight problems which, if left unaddressed, could produce a catastrophic accident."

Nearly four years after the Blue Line derailment, and 18 months after the Post article, a Green Line train derailed outside of the Mt. Vernon Square station. At 3:45 pm on January 7, 2007, the fifth car of the six-car train derailed, injuring 23 people. The NTSB determined that a problem with wheel maintenance caused the derailment. In the Railroad Accident Report, the NTSB also identified systemic problems within Metrorail. From the the report, RAR-07-03,

WMATA was aware of the wheel climb derailment problem with the 5000-series cars before this accident. Transit industry research and discussions with WMATA management indicate WMATA was aware of work done by the Transportation Research Board for the National Academy of Science and National Academy of Engineering on flange climb derailments in transit operations. Additionally, WMATA commissioned, participated in, and received the final Wheel-Rail Interface Study from the TTCI. Extensive testing to determine the cause of these relatively similar derailments in the 5000-series cars failed to produce a solid answer. Also, the APTA panel concluded that there was no single cause in the seven derailments it examined; however, the panel did identify several specific factors and made recommendations for WMATA to consider to prevent future derailments. Nonetheless, after requesting reviews by industry experts and funding related research work, WMATA failed to effectively address the proposed safety recommendations before this accident. The Safety Board therefore believes that WMATA should establish a process, including a single point of responsibility, to prompt timely evaluation and action on proposed safety improvements that are identified as a result of accident and derailment investigations and related research projects.

In June 2008, an Orange Line train derailed outside of the Courthouse Metro station. There were no injuries, but over 400 passengers needed to be rescued from the tunnel. Significant damage was done to the track in the area. Interestingly, the train operator did not immediately realize the derailment had occurred. A Metro supervisor happened to be riding on the train, felt a jolt, and alerted the train operator. The train had traveled more than 2,300 feet with the front wheels of the third car off the track.

An internal Metro investigation determined that a track walker had failed to report a significant problem with the track in the area. From a WMATA statement:

"Our inspector failed to recognize the out-of-tolerance rail conditions," according to Metro's Chief Safety Officer Ronald Keele. "The track conditions compounded with the forces of the moving train caused one wheel to climb atop one track and the other wheel to drop to the ground. We are very fortunate that there were no injuries."

The findings of Metro's internal investigation determined that the track inspector failed to detect "defects in the track's geometry" in the area of the derailment and "violated several inspection procedures," according to Keele.

The inspector did not inform the Operations Control Center of dangerous track conditions, did not report any dangerous or defective conditions to his supervisor, and failed to properly measure the space between the two tracks.

The inspector was suspended for five days as it was his first offense. Again, Metro stated they would work to revamp their training for track inspectors.

Metro's safety record regarding derailments highlights significant organizational deficiencies. Time and again, there was prior warning that problems could develop. Time and again, these warnings went unheeded. The same pattern emerges when looking at prior collisions and "near-misses" on Metro. Again, we see warnings from both within Metro and the NTSB that were ignored. It was no secret that trouble was brewing.

The NTSB issued multiple recommendations to Metro to ensure enhanced track worker safety. These included:

• Establishing procedures to be used for members of a work crew to acknowledge a lookout's warning that a train is approaching on a particular track from a particular direction before a lookout gives an all clear signal to a train. (R-08-01)
• Establish a systematic program for frequent unannounced checks of employee compliance with Metrorail operating and safety rules and procedures. (R-08-02)
• Perform periodic hazard analyses on the deficiencies identified by unannounced checks of employee compliance in response to Safety Recommendation R-08-02, and use the results to revise Metrorail training curricula or enforcement activities, as necessary, to improve employee compliance with operating and safety rules and procedures. (R-08-03)
• Promptly implement appropriate technology that will automatically alert wayside workers of approaching trains and will automatically alert train operators when approaching areas with workers on or near the tracks. (R-08-04)

At the time of these recommendations, NTSB member (and now Chairwoman) Deborah Hersman felt that Metro did not have a strong culture of safety. Hersman was quoted, "a strong safety culture doesn't take dollars; it takes a will. They had rules. Those rules weren't observed."

In the wake of the NTSB findings, Metro general manager John Catoe vowed to make the transit system the safest in the country. Catoe said Metro would look at adding new technology to improve the safety of track workers. Polly Hanson, the Metro safety and security "czar" at the time, said she hoped to implement the NTSB's recommendations for alert equipment. Anonymous sources told the Washington Post that staff within the rail department were not in favor of this due to the extra work it would require.

Around this time, Metro hired a new Chief Safety Officer. Ronald Keele was brought on as part of Catoe's safety reform efforts. Keele had previously served in a similar role at Metro, and then at MTA in Maryland. He was also chief safety officer for NASA's space shuttle program, in the time period prior to the Columbia accident. Keele said one of his top priorities would be improving safety for track workers.

In July 2008, Catoe attended a Federal Transit Administration Safety Summit. From a U.S. Department of Transportation newsletter:

Mr. Catoe raised the following issues such as recognizing gradual changes to operating conditions, getting "out in front" of safety problems publicly, and leadership acceptance of responsibility and commitment to solving and tracking problems. Mr. Catoe emphasized the importance of top‐down leadership and accountability, and direct communication with employees. He also shared the importance of rules enforcement programs and agency‐wide participation.

In the nearly two years since the new safety chief was hired and the NTSB reports were issued, it's unclear how much progress has been made. According to WMATA's web site, Alexa Dupigny-Samuels now holds the position of Chief Safety Officer. Dupigny-Samuels was appointed in February 2009. The press release announcing Dupigny-Samuel's appointment offers no information about Keele's future. Metro has not answered inquiries about Keele's departure or reassignment. The latest update regarding the track worker protection technology was that Metro was still considering the options.

Tragedy would again strike Metro track workers this year. On August 9, Mike Nash, 63, was struck and killed by a gravel-spreading machine on the Orange Line. Nash had been working on the rails for 19 years. The NTSB declined to investigate that incident, as it did not involve a train, but rather maintenance equipment. On September 10, John Moore, 44, was struck by a train between the Braddock Road and National Airport stations. He died four days later. The NTSB was notified of the incident. At this time, Metro has offered little information about the incident. Moore worked with communications equipment, but it is unclear what work he was doing at the time of the accident.

It remains to be seen the cause of Moore's death, and whether it is directly related to any of the problems identified by the NTSB in 2006. With regard to the 2009 deaths, Catoe says that Metro has "got to get back to the basics of safety." Operating a railroad is dangerous, and there will be accidents, this much is for sure. However, given the seriousness of the NTSB recommendations issued not even two years ago, it is important to evaluate whether Metro has improved. Has Metro been able to develop the culture of safety Hersman deemed so important? Has the turnover in the safety department hampered these efforts? Has John Catoe lived up to his words of getting "out in front" of problems? The answer to these questions become clearer after looking at all of the areas of Metro safety.

In the next part of the series, we will look at Metro's history of derailments, their causes, and Metro's reaction.

The goal of this series, The Price of Safety, is shine a light on Metro's safety record and attempt to identify ways that Metro can improve safety given limited resources. By identifying current and historical shortcomings, it is possible to lay out a roadmap for reform. This is not a series about the June 22 crash, but rather a bigger picture look at Metro's self-proclaimed "culture of safety." This is also not an attempt to blame Metro for circumstances beyond their control, but to identify positive steps to address the issues that they can control and avoid future problems where possible.

Metro is at a crossroads, suffering budgetary problems and the consequences of the organization's worst rail disaster. There is never an easy or convenient time for an organization to undertake significant and ground shaking changes. For Metro, however, many needed changes are ripe or even overdue.

The following is a brief sketch of where this series will go, and what will be covered. I will break the sections up as logically as possible, with the goal of a new post each week. I will try to present as much objective information as possible in order to draw a reasonable and honest summary of the current state of safety.

Previous incidents

• Struck workers: Fatal incidents involving track workers
• Derailments: From the 1982 fatal derailment to present
• Collisions: The 1996, 2004 and 2009 crashes
• Near-misses: Focusing on the 2005 incident outside Foggy Bottom, but looking at others, including the 2009 near-miss at Potomac Avenue

Metro's safety priorities and response to crises

• Communication with NTSB and the Tri-State Oversight Committee
• Safety management structure and institutional memory. Is there a true "culture of safety" within Metro?

Looking ahead, the potential for reform

• The next steps: Immediate changes
• Bigger picture: 'Creative destruction' to Metro's organizational chart
• Financial and political considerations versus passenger safety: A life or death struggle

I hope you'll join me in taking a critical look at a vital part of our region's infrastructure.