Posts about FHWA

New marked crosswalks alone, without other measures designed to reduce traffic speeds, shorten crossing distances, enhance driver awareness of the crossing, and/or provide active warning of pedestrian presence, should not be installed across uncontrolled roadways.

Local agencies, reluctant to make cars go slower and short of funds to install the pedestrian warning lights called hawk beacons, usually take this as an injunction to simply leave the crossing unmarked.

The MUTCD bases this provision on studies of crash data. Pedestrians crossing big highways, these studies report, have a greater chance of being hit by drivers at marked crosswalks than at similar unmarked ones.

There are several possible reasons for this.

• Traffic engineers often locate marked crosswalks at the places where they interfere least with vehicle movement. Pedestrians may put a higher priority on safety when choosing where to cross.
  
• Politicians may demand crosswalk markings at the intersections with repeated crashes, meaning the crashes are not a consequence of the marked crosswalk but the cause.
  
• Researchers have other suggestions, too, as Tom Vanderbilt discusses on page 198 of his book Traffic.

Whatever the causes of this phenomenon, if it is real, there is an easy way to save lives: FHWA and state transportation agencies could instruct pedestrians to ignore crosswalk markings when they cross highways without traffic lights. Cross at whatever intersection feels safest, not the one with a marked crosswalk.

Of course, you will never hear that advice in a safety campaign. They urge pedestrians, as the current DC effort puts it, to "always use a crosswalk." Pedestrians understand this to mean a marked one, and the campaigns reinforce that belief with images of marked crosswalks.

The FHWA's own pedestrian safety campaign does not explicitly recommend using marked crosswalks. But—somewhat like advertising for an escort service—what isn't said matters more than what's said. The text assumes that the reader already has an idea of what's going on and carefully avoids correcting that impression. The real message is in the pictures.

Why would highway agencies promote pedestrian behavior that their research shows to be unsafe? One potential reason is that the traffic engineers don't really believe the research. The study results are often inconsistent; the researchers offer many cautions. Scientists know that when you get a result contrary to common sense, it's most often wrong. If it still stands up after checking and double-checking, you may have a great discovery, but more often you'll find a subtle mistake buried in your work.

The other possibility is that safety isn't really what this recommendation is about. Rather, it may reflect drivers' desire, reinforced by the historic biases of the traffic engineering profession, to get pedestrians out of unmarked crosswalks where they slow down cars. Peter Norton has shown that safety campaigns, when they started in the 1920s, aimed to push pedestrians off the streets and make room for cars.

Intentionally or not, the traffic engineering profession gravitates toward conclusions that support its existing practices and priorities. When the research supports a road design that speeds traffic—wonderful! A safety recommendation that would slow down vehicles—unthinkable!

They analyzed a number of options and condensed them down to 3 bicycle and pedestrian options, 4 roadway options, and 6 Transportation Demand Management options. This post looks at the roadway and TDM alternatives; the next one will delve into the bicycle and pedestrian options.

Vehicular options

One of the most significant conclusions from the draft EIS is what it chose not to recommend: More single-passenger vehicle capacity. The team looked at adding new general-purpose lanes (which, on a freeway-type bridge, aren't as much "general purpose" as "motor vehicle only") or HOT lanes. Once Virginia decided not to run HOT lanes through Arlington, the HOT lane options became moot, and adding new auto capacity generally did not reduce congestion.

There are 5 remaining proposals that would affect motor vehicles:

Add a bus lane. A lot of commuter buses drive to the Pentagon and then over the 14th Street bridge to DC, and many local buses also cross in this area. This alternative would use the existing shoulder of the Rochambeau bridge (the center of the 3 road bridges, which carries the express lanes in both directions) for a bus lane, and convert one lane on 14th Street to a bus lane.

The heavy volume of buses moves a great many people in this corridor. Helping buses bypass congestion and give riders a quicker ride would further improve the value of taking transit from many parts of Virginia.

Ban left turns at 14th and C (at a cost of about $203,000). C Street SW ends at 14th, in the last intersection with a traffic signal before the bridge. The study says that giving time for vehicles to turn left from southbound 14th onto C, or left from C onto southbound 14th, creates significant delay, and this option would forbid these turns. Drivers would only be able to turn right in or out of C.

On its own, this sounds like a bad idea because it would move further away from a functional grid in this area, and make 14th more like a freeway. It could, however, be a reasonable way to reduce some of the extra delay that comes from the bus lane option, making that a little more palatable.

The most important question, which the report does not specify, is how this would affect pedestrians. People cross on foot to get to and from the Holocaust Museum, for instance, and already the signal here forces them to wait long periods of time for the various movements. Removing the left turns could allow more pedestrian crossing time, or it could make things worse, depending on the final signal timings.

DC should also add a marked crosswalk along the south side of this intersection, where there is none today. Every side of every intersection ought to have a marked crosswalk, regardless of its effect on traffic, but an animation of the proposal makes it appear that there would be no traffic effect with left turns prohibited, anyway.

For the final EIS, the team should investigate pedestrian crossings and suggest timings that help them cross more safely and with a shorter wait.

Restripe around Maine Avenue, 7th and 9th Streets ($185,000). There are a lot of ramps on and off in this area, creating a lot of merging and weaving. This option would narrow the on-ramp at Maine Avenue to 1 lane instead of 2, reducing the amount of merging on the freeway itself.

Also, it would add a solid white line between some of the freeway's lanes east of 9th Street. Drivers getting on at 7th Street would only be able to then continue to the 3rd Street tunnel (the one that goes under the Mall to New York Avenue, also signed as I-395), and drivers getting on from 9th Street would have to continue onto the Southeast Freeway (now signed as 695) instead. Drivers might ignore this line, but FHWA hopes it will decrease weaving.

Remove some ramps on the Virginia side ($2.7 million). There are 10 ramps on and off 395 right around the Pentagon, also creating a lot of merging and weaving. This alternative suggests removing the ramps from 395 northbound to the GW parkway northbound, and the matching ramp from the GW Parkway southbound to 395 southbound. Drivers can still get where they need to go by taking Washington Boulevard (Route 27) instead, which is actually shorter, anyway.

In addition, this alternative would change around the ramps at Boundary Channel Drive, the access road to the Pentagon north parking lots. Now, there are cloverleaf-style ramps on and off of 395 southbound, so that cars coming from or going to each direction of Boundary Channel have their own ramps.

Instead, the ramps in the southwest quadrant would go away, and the northwest quadrant ramps changed so that cars can turn in either direction on and off of Boundary Channel.

Arlington has proposed another option to add roundabouts instead of traffic signals at the ends of the ramps.

Transportation Demand Management options

Reconfiguring roadways is not the only way to reduce congestion. Transportation Demand Management is the field concerned with helping people better understand their travel options besides solo driving. Maps, real-time information, and public service ad campaigns can help people choose transit. Employers can provide incentives or assistance for people to carpool, telecommute, or commute outside peak hours.

The TDM options that the DEIS proposed to carry forward to the final version include:

• Expand incentives for telecommuting
  
• Expand flexible work hours
  
• Increase prices for parking and/or decrease supply
  
• Better coordinate among agencies along the corridor (Federal, District, state, and local) to share information and respond to crashes or other incidents
  
• Create a program to educate drivers in the corridor in "[crash] avoidance maneuvers and defensive driving skills"
  
• Make signs better and more consistent across the corridor

The study team is accepting comments on the draft EIS until March 15th. They will then begin work on the final EIS. I will send them all comments made on this post through at least the end of Wednesday, March 14. If you want to send them your own, more detailed comments, you can do so through this form.

The bicycle and pedestrian proposals, meanwhile, are worth a whole discussion on their own. Part 2 will examine these in detail.

The study looked at 4 options for widening the parkway in addition to a no-build alternative. Two alternatives looked at adding a lane in each direction in the median. The other two alternatives studied adding a lane in each direction to the outside of the roadway. Space constraints mean that any widening requires a combination of both inside and outside widening as well as rebuilding numerous overpasses and underpasses.

The difference between the two inside and two outside designs is in design standards. For each type of widening, the consultants looked at AASHTO-compliant standards and National Park Service standards.

The AASHTO options called for adding a 12-foot wide travel lane, a 10-foot wide outside (right) shoulder, and a 10-foot wide inside (left) shoulder. The NPS options included adding a 12-foot wide travel lane, an 8-foot wide outside shoulder with curb and gutter, and a 3-foot wide inside shoulder with curb and gutter.

Estimated costs ranged from a high of $565 million for the AASHTO outside widening option to a low of $343 million for the NPS inside widening option.

Despite the investment, though, the study shows that the Parkway would be just as congested as it is today by the year 2040. FHWA expects any increase in capacity to be matched by a corresponding increase in vehicle trips. A widened parkway would carry more cars, but it ultimately wouldn't shorten people's trips.

Widening the parkway is the wrong approach from a growth perspective, too. Prince George's County has long had a problem focusing growth in the "developed tier." Adding freeway capacity will only increase the pressure to build in parts of the county and the region that do not have the infrastructure for it.

Adding lanes to the parkway would also hurt the developed communities it passes through. In many places, it already forms a significant barrier between neighborhoods. More traffic and more pollution along the roadway will hurt many residents and the pastoral image the National Park Service believes the Parkway should exude.

Staff at the meeting stressed that further studies would need to look at options beyond just widening the parkway. Other options could include improvements to transit, other roadways, or spot "improvements" along the BW Parkway.

If any money were available for widening, it would be better spent on improving transit between Baltimore and Washington. Maryland could speed up trains on MARC and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and add capacity for more trains, extend Metro's Green Line, or create incentives for carpooling.

As the region continues to grow, we need to focus on building livable and walkable communities. Widening a freeway encourages traditional sprawl, and it sends the wrong message about the region's priorities.

Comments on the study are still being accepted, though only for the next 2 to 3 weeks. If you have thoughts on whether the parkway needs extra lanes, you can submit written comments on the project's website.

The next step for the project team is to finalize a report to Congress showing the estimated costs, benefits, and impacts of adding a third northbound and third southbound lane to the roadway. Beyond that, it's up to Congress to decide whether to leave the Parkway as-is, undertake further study, or begin to plan for construction.

The options FTA gave DDOT

Let's start with the 2nd claim, that FTA gave DDOT plenty of options in July. The 3 options, according to Brian Farber, Associate Administrator from the Office of Communications and Congressional Affairs, were:

1. To reopen the FHWA EIS document and evaluate streetcar for the bridge.
2. To conduct an expedited FTA EA and evaluate streetcar on the bridge.
3. To extend the northern terminus of the current Historic Anacostia FTA EA to include the 11th Street bridge, and evaluate streetcar from the Anacostia Metro station to the western terminus of the bridge.

In this July 28 letter, DDOT Director Terry Bellamy tells FTA that they've decided to take the tracks off the project, as a result of a meeting a month earlier where USDOT officials "stated that because streetcar infrastructure was not included in the record of decision for [the EIS], it could not be included as part of the bridge construction."

However, this is all happening while the bridge has long been under construction. Work began in December 2009. According to several people familiar with the bridge project, DDOT at this point faced two unpleasant choices: pull the tracks off the bridge, or start an environmental process that could take years.

Besides the extensive public participation process that would have been required, the bridge EIS had drawn a lawsuit for the way it added cross-river vehicular capacity while claiming it didn't. Personally, I agreed with the opponents and think DDOT made a mistake doing the bridge this way. Adding the "missing link" may well draw vehicle trips through the region off the Woodrow Wilson Bridge and into DC.

But that's water under the bridge, as it were, and now that the bridge is half built, it doesn't seem wise of DDOT to reopen all those cans of worms. I'm skeptical it would best "save taxpayer monies in the long run" to delay work while a long EIS occurs, and potentially incur huge penalties from the contractor if the EIS takes very long, as it likely would.

People familiar with the discussions (including additional people beyond those I spoke to for the original story) confirm the basic truth of what I reported. Unfortunately, everyone is very reluctant to be quoted publicly. Transportation professionals will inevitably have to work with federal agencies. They don't want to raise the ire of FTA and imperil other projects.

Did FTA have leeway?

All of the options FTA offered involved not putting the tracks on the bridge until after further environmental review. If FTA really felt they had absolutely no choice, then what they did was best. They stopped DDOT as they had to, but they gave DDOT various (unpalatable) alternatives.

But did they have to? I spoke to several transportation professionals who feel FTA could have let the tracks go forward, or at least let DC finish them with local dollars. Commenter Will P (who is familiar with the situation) agreed, writing:

DC had the ability and planned to pay for the rails on the bridge with local money. What FTA is saying is that if DC chose to put in the rails on the Bridge before their mandated studies, they would then be disqualified from getting federal dollars for segments that would connect to the Bridge.

I've asked FTA's media relations folks to further explain the issue from FTA's standpoint, but they aren't experts on federal law, either, and haven't yet gotten back to me with specifics.

This is an unusual situation because the key decision point is coming not during the early design phases or during bidding, but after the project has long been underway. According to people familiar with the process, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) had signed off on project documents which did include the streetcars. These include early construction documents and also "Plans, Specifications & Estimates" (PS&E) reports.

Here's the core of the timeline, as best as I can understand it from talking to numerous people:

1. DDOT completed an EIS for the bridge that included "accommodation" of transit but was vague about what transit exactly would be included. The EIS won an award from FHWA for its public process.
   
2. DDOT prepared to build the project with mostly local dollars. They decided to include tracks to save money in the future on the streetcar network.
   
3. DDOT switched to use mostly federal money on the project. They were working with FHWA. The construction documents and intermediate PS&Es signed off on by FHWA included the tracks.
   
4. At some point, when DDOT asked to switch the type of tracks to comply with Buy America, people at FHWA realized they should involve FTA and talked to FTA about the tracks.
   
5. FTA judged that the tracks hadn't gone through proper process. FHWA then told DDOT they couldn't do the tracks without more review.
   
6. FTA suggested 3 options for DDOT to get approval for the tracks, which would have required longer process that could have delayed the entire project and cost more money.
   
7. In July, DDOT decided not to pursue those and finish the project without the tracks.

In step 3, DDOT officials apparently believed that they had the necessary federal approvals to go ahead with tracks, since FHWA had signed off on documents. Maybe DDOT should have realized they should go talk to FTA. Maybe they were hoping nobody would notice so they didn't have to. Or maybe they honestly thought everything was fine.

Clearly, if DDOT had gone through some more process years ago, we would all be better off today. DDOT officials admit they probably screwed up, in hindsight. But federal processes are very complex. A agency can go extremely slowly and make absolutely sure they cross every t and dot every i (and still maybe make mistakes), or they can try to move faster and do the best they can. DDOT, from at least Dan Tangherlini through Gabe Klein, was trying to move fast and get a lot done. Somewhere along the way (though before Gabe Klein took over), this happened.

But in June, whatever happened before, we were faced with this situation: One federal agency had been telling DDOT they could go ahead; now another stepped in and said no. Maybe federal law is so unambiguous that the tracks can't possibly go forward, even if FHWA had approved them for months, even with local money, that FTA officials had absolutely no choice. But was it?

Could they have said, "That's too bad, this one got by. Hey, FHWA, please try to keep an eye out for stuff like this in the future, and DDOT, we're going to ask you to be a little more careful next time. Okay? Let's just do the tracks anyway and we'll all try to do better."

Or, could they have said, "We're sorry, we really don't think that it's legal to use federal money for the tracks, but if you want to use some local money, we'll let this be a 'nonparticipating' part of the project."

That's the question. Rogoff's letter suggests these two options were not available to FTA. Other transportation professionals say they were. This question defines the issue of whether FTA "put up a roadblock" in July, or just acted as they must.

Update: In the Post piece, Rogoff also adds another option, placing removable blocks on the bridge that can be changed to tracks in the future. Rogoff's piece says DDOT declined to pursue any options, including the removable blocks, but DDOT spokesperson John Lisle says the removable blocks are indeed what DDOT is doing as part of making the bridge "streetcar ready."

Lisle says that DC will save some money, at least $1.5 million, of the $300 million project for not putting in the tracks, but it will cost more to install the tracks later. DDOT doesn't have figures on how much, exactly, it will cost in the future to add tracks.

Adding them later will also force DDOT to close down lanes on the bridge. Right now, the bridge is being built next to the old bridge, allowing all of the traffic that currently uses the bridge to keep doing so during almost all of the construction. Once the new bridge opens and the old one demolished, a track project will require interfering with existing traffic.

So why couldn't DDOT include the tracks? Environmental review rules, federal officials' interpretations of those rules, and DDOT's eagerness to move quickly all mixed together.

DDOT completed its Environmental Impact Statement for the bridge project in 2006, working with the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The "Purpose and Need" of the project, an official statement in any EIS that defines its goals, was to deal with traffic congestion stemming from the "missing link" between the bridge and the Anacostia Freeway to the northeast.

A secondary Purpose and Need was to better connect neighborhoods on each side of the river and to the waterfront itself. The freeway acts as a barrier, and getting across on any motorized vehicle requires getting onto a freeway and then off again. Therefore, DDOT decided to separate freeway and local bridges. The EIS mentioned that the local bridge would be designed for "future transit accommodation."

Is including tracks "accommodation" or not? What is "accommodation"? Is it just building the bridge with the structural capacity to handle streetcar vehicles? The actual slabs to underlie tracks? The underground conduit for power and foundations for catenary poles? All of the infrastructure short of actual service? The EIS doesn't specify.

DDOT originally planned to use mostly local money for the project, but switched to make it mainly federal when the stimulus bill passed. Significant funding became available to projects that were ready to obligate their money within 6 months, and the 11th Street Bridge was one of the few large enough projects ready to go.

People familiar with the conversations between DDOT and federal officials, speaking only on condition of anonymity, say that FHWA had signed off on contracts that included mention of the rails, but in early summer, DDOT tried to change the type of rails in order to comply with Buy America requirements that mandate more expensive, domestic rails. FHWA then brought in FTA, which objected to the project not having gone through even more environmental review.

FHWA ultimately appeared willing to give DDOT permission to include the tracks, according to the people familiar with the discussions, but FTA said no. Ironically, the federal government has subsequently offered waivers to Buy America around rails.

The question here is whether FTA had to make the decision they did, or had leeway. And if they had leeway, should they have used it to let the project move forward?

Already, federal regulations impose greater burdens on transit projects. To get funding, transit projects have to meet complex cost-effectiveness criteria while highway projects do not. The FTA acts at times like it's the Federal Make Transit More Difficult Administration. That's not because they're anti-transit, per se, but simply that they are regulating transit, FHWA is regulating roads, and FTA is the stricter parent.

One of the FTA's added hurdles is a requirement that environmental analyses not "prejudice" their decision for any mode. Local agencies have to study many modes, even ones that seem ridiculous on their face, like heavy rail transit for a project that evidently is best as bus or streetcar, or even considering monorail alongside other modes. Highway projects have no comparable requirement; cities don't have to study whether every new road should be carpool-only, for instance.

FTA officials objected that putting tracks on the bridge could predjudice the the Environmental Assessment (EA) underway for streetcar service in Anacostia. Even though DC already has a streetcar segment under construction in part of Anacostia and has made a citywide commitment to streetcars, FTA requires them to pretend none of that exists for the purpose of thinking about Anacostia. In the meantime, they're stopping another transit facility from being part of a project.

There are only 5 bridges connecting DC neighborhoods across the Anacostia, and they're each rebuilt once a generation at most. The EIS already considered the provision of transit service, which in any event has only positive environmental consequences for surrounding neighborhoods compared to single-passenger motor vehicle traffic.

Federal officials have substantial leeway within the regulations to help projects move forward more smoothly or put up obstacles. Sadly, in this case those at FTA seem to have chosen the latter. Instead, perhaps FTA should have been excited to see DC's commitment to transit and willingness to put money, including substantial local money, behind it.

Last year, some said that FTA officials were annoyed with DDOT for moving ahead with tracks on H Street, using local money, without involving FTA. This might have contributed to their rejecting DC for an Urban Circulator grant.

Perhaps DDOT could have worked better with its federal partners, and it probably should have involved FTA sooner in the 11th Street bridge project. But the federal agencies also create a disincentive to work with them when they impose even more rules than NEPA, the environmental act that mandates EISes and EAs, really requires.

The Adrian Fenty and Gabe Klein approach was to move forward as quickly as possible and get things done, sometimes with a minimum of process. In some cases, that led to action that might otherwise have gotten mired in years of debate but which are now remarkably successful, like the cycle tracks or Capital Bikeshare. With this bridge, that posture alienated some federal officials.

DDOT should take more care to follow proper process, and its current leadership is taking pains to rebuild relationships with federal partners even though that likely means slowing progress on streetcar and other projects. That's a good strategy. But federal employees should think about the big picture, too. If they slow down projects whose DOTs try to move fast but maybe come off as a little arrogant along the way, the end result is to hurt transit and the residents of cities who need its service today.

Now, before there can be tracks on the bridge, DDOT will have to undergo an environmental review, then find and program the extra money for the construction. 2020 might be an optimistic timeframe at this point, whereas the money was already in hand to build the tracks this year had FTA chosen to be flexible instead of taking the strictest approach.

Meanwhile, DC expects major development around Saint Elizabeth's and elsewhere in Ward 8. Sadly, our ability to better connect this important and growing area to the rest of the city has just lost a decade, thanks to this decision.

Other places, including many major cities, push the limits. They try sanctioned experiments (such as DC's bike lane on New Hampshire Avenue near U Street), research the effects, and use the results to help improve the standards moving forward.

The National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO) is an association of these more innovative transportation departments in major cities. Dissatisfied with the slow pace of improvement in the existing standards, NACTO released its own guide at the National Bike Summit this year.

NACTO's executive director is Eric Gilliland, who had previously helmed the Washington Area Bicyclist Association; its president is New York City transportation commissioner Janette Sadik-Khan. The organization represents transportation department heads from major cities across the nation, including the District of Columbia.

The guide spotlights examples from cities leading the way, including DDOT's recent installations on New Hampshire Avenue and 15th Street. It also creates a set of rules that other cities can use to implement these facilities.

While this effort to push the envelope takes shape on the national stage, where does that put state and local transportation departments, and what types of bike facilities will we be seeing on our streets?

Already accepted are the traditional elements of infrastructure, like standard bike lanes, and newer markings that have entered the canon, such as sharrows.

However, a new wrinkle was introduced the week after NACTO unveiled its guide. FHWA issued a clarification to the MUTCD, clearly listing which bicycle facilities are permitted, which are not covered by the MUTCD, and which are currently experimental, to be considered for future inclusion in the MUTCD.

Cycle tracks, contraflow lanes, two-stage left turns, and bikeway refuge islands are not prohibited by the MUTCD. More treatments will likely join them in the future. Bike boxes and green pavement for bike lanes are considered experimental treatments that may be adopted by the MUTCD in the future.

Treatments like buffered bike lanes are included in the more progressive NACTO guide but not in the more conservative AASHTO guide. AASHTO's guide is in the process of being updated, for release by the end of the year, perhaps. But don't expect anything revolutionary. Many of the innovative facilities in NACTO's new document are unlikely to be included in the upcoming version of AASHTO's guide.

Until AASHTO catches up to include facilities we're already seeing in American cities, NACTO's guide will serve as the place where the cutting edge is first formalized into guidelines. Although our bike lanes won't change overnight, these developments are key steps on the way to seeing things like the 15th Street protected bike lane implemented in cities large and small across the nation.