Posts about Civil Liberties

That video excerpts from a longer one that shows the officers telling people they'd be arrested without further warning if anyone danced, then turning around and arresting a couple who had started very subtly shuffling back and forth while embracing in a somewhat dance-like way.

You also can see the officers roughing up and even choking a few people during the arrests. However, the man being choked did appear to be resisting arrest. As Don of We Love DC points out, the physical force started once one protestor tried to pull another one away from an officer trying to arrest him.

Like Don, I agree with the protestors' mission. It's ridiculous to preventing quiet dancing at the memorial under the argument that it should be reserved for "quiet contemplation," especially since schoolkids are often quite rowdy. The government has an interest in stopping loud protests that might disrupt others, but to arrest that couple who are silently swaying back and forth in an embrace looks ridiculous. But protestors who physically fight the officers don't help the cause.

However, if it takes police away from patrolling platforms, and as a result someone gets hurt or killed by regular non-terrorist thugs, that should be Taborn's problem. But it's not his job to consider this program in light of the bigger picture.

That's Richard Sarles' job, and Sarles has fallen down on this job. Sarles should not have authorized moving forward on a program whose value is extremely dubious, given other public safety needs and other potential drawbacks. Perhaps any security program, no matter what its value, is a good idea to Taborn, but someone higher up in the chain needs to intervene and say that such a controversial and intrusive program isn't worth the huge range of costs.

The same issue emerged with the 7000-series railcars. The people in charge of the railcars didn't want to consider longitudinal seating (where people sit with their back to the wall) because it might be a little bit less safe. However, they could not quantify this at all.

Assuming a train crashes into another, which it shouldn't since WMATA ought to fix the signals, then maybe—maybe—someone might get thrown a little farther down the car than they might have otherwise, which could possibly lead to a little bit more harm. Or something.

But what is the chance someone would fall off a platform that wouldn't be so overcrowded if cars had more capacity? Who knows? That's not the 7000 Series designers' problem.

On Monday, RAC member Carol Carter Walker also asked whether MTPD had done any outreach to the community or civil liberties groups before instituting the program. Deputy Chief Ron Pavlik seemed baffled by the suggestion that they should work with anyone outside MTPD as opposed to simply "notifying" the Board, riders, and others that the searches were going to happen. They certainly didn't talk to the RAC.

Jay Marks of DC said in his comments, "I don't have any confidence that the Metro Board will listen to [the RAC] either, but thanks for trying." Based on Board Chairman Peter Benjamin's comments to Dr. Gridlock, there's reason to worry the Board may not stand up for liberty. If they don't, they're doing a lot of harm to the agency they represent.

It's always politically tough for elected or appointed officials to stand up in the face of comments like, "If only one person's life is saved, then this program is worth it." That's the kind of thinking that is leading the Board to put every safety measure, no matter how questionable in value, above every other kind of repair the system needs, or Sarles to put this bag search program above all other public safety priorities.

There's an easier way out. The Board should agree to hold a public hearing on this issue and members should express their concerns about the program in a meeting. Then, Sarles, who's going to leave really soon anyway, should quietly stop performing the searches, just as they started them with little notice. Everyone can claim to still be protecting safety, and WMATA can reverse a very bad decision.

One of the more eloquent speakers was a colonel in the United States Air Force. He said of the searches, "Regardless of whether [they're] constitutional, [they're] not right... If we give up liberty for security, we dishonor the sacrifice" of those who have died to protect this country.

Johnny Barnes from ACLU of the Nation's Capital said, "We can be safe and free, but we are not safe if we are not free." Sue Udry from Defending Dissent noted that FDR's famous "Four Freedoms" includes "freedom from fear," and said that this program fosters an "atmosphere of fear."

Others made less philosophical but more practical arguments. Andy Hunt argued that if he can walk 10 blocks to avoid a "peak of the peak" fare, then a terrorist certainly could do so. Apparently, quite a few people agree. A petition opposing the searches from the Montgomery County Civil Rights Coalition has been signed by over 600 people, evenly split between Maryland, Virginia, and the District.

Representatives of Metro Transit Police (MTPD), though, weren't fazed by the opposition. Deputy Chief Ron Pavlik gave a very brief presentation of the program without addressing concerns around effectiveness or the fear of an ever-encroaching police state.

In fact, when asked if MTPD would ever voluntarily discontinue the program, Pavlik said that would happen "when the world changes." For many in the audience and for many at MTPD, I expect, that means never.

MTPD Captain Kevin Gaddis noted that of the 55 comments Metro had received regarding this topic through their online comment system, most were supportive of the policy.

MTPD has run 5 station bag checks and screened approximately 100 riders. Only one bag tested positive, and the follow-up X-ray screening cleared that person's bag. No one has declined to be screened, although if someone left before encountering an officer, they wouldn't have been counted.

Gaddis characterized each of these sessions as "successful." When pressed, he clarified that "successful" means that the officers completed the screening with a minimum of passenger delay, no incidents occurred, and they made a "show of force" against terrorism.

Whether any terrorists were deterred, the officers couldn't say, nor whether this program has been effective in any other cities.

Searchees are selected at random by counting bags "larger than a typical woman's purse," and stopping the rider representing a predetermined number without respect to the characteristics of theat rider. No one is exempt from the searches, including children and Metro employees.

Anyone can decline to be screened, though they will not be allowed to board the train with the bag. If someone refuses a bag search, they will be permitted to "leave the bag in their car" and then board the train. When pressed about riders who arrive on foot, bicycle, or by bus and would otherwise be stranded, Pavlik agreed that riders would indeed be permitted to board a Metrobus with the bag in question.

On the other hand, Pavlik said that they could use "other means" if someone refuses to have their bag searched and leaves. They would not elaborate on what these "other means" were, and specifically avoided addressing whether these means included following or questioning search refusers.

If someone is selected for a random search and elects to allow the screening, the exterior of their bag will be examined for explosive residue. This search is only for explosives. However, if the sensor detects the residue, the officers will run the bag through an X-ray machine. If they see anything suspicious, they could open the bag, and if they find anything illegal in the second round of screening, whether explosive or not, the rider could be charged.

MTPD considers this program to come at "no cost" to the agency. The officers used for these screenings are funded through a $26 million, multi-year antiterrorism grant from the TSA. The grant funds the officers' salaries, equipment, and training. Only certain programs qualify, though that doesn't necessarily have to include random bag searches. One requirement of the grant is "visibility", which MTPD has fulfilled in the past through major "shows of force" at selected stations.

Of course, as Pavlik admitted, these officers could perform for other tasks in the system were they not screening bags. But the police force seems unable to recognize the concept of resource prioritization. Repeatedly, RAC members asked whether this was a wise use of resources. The MTPD representatives only responded that a "layered approach" was ideal, and that no one approach was best.

If bag searches take resources away from something known to be effective, that's okay with MTPD, because it means better layering. But that's a recipe for bad policy. They also seemed unconcerned that this particular layer, even with its indeterminate value, could potentially run afoul of civil liberties and undermine public support for Metro.

As far as delay is concerned, the Transit Police only seem concerned that in general the flow through the station is unimpeded. They characterized the delay to individuals as only approximately 20 seconds, but later revealed that they only count the time from when the bag "hits the table". The time when a rider is pulled aside, spoken with, or a delay resulting from a missed train or connection is not considered.

Several members of the audience pointed out even a 30 second check can result in a "cascading effect" on riders. Missing one train might mean missing an hourly bus, and an hour in the extreme cold or summer heat is an added burden to Metro's valued customers.

With respect to the searches themselves, the Transit Police report that they are not retaining any personal data from passengers who undergo screening. Records are kept regarding how many searches are done, how long they take, and at which stations they occur.

Proposals to run bag searches came up in 2005 and 2008, but following public pushback and concerns from the WMATA Board, the previous GMs and police chiefs decided not to move ahead. This time, Interim GM Sarles and Chief Taborn gave their approval with only the briefest of notifications to the Board.

I'm glad the Metro Transit Police Department is trying to make our system more secure. But this particular application, even if it's only one layer, is an inefficient and ineffective use of resources. It erodes personal liberties and public support for Metro. The Board should step in to stop the program.

I'd like to know what this is costing and whether there are other ways to spend the money. It's been reported that these are TSA personnel, not MTPD. It was also reported that this money is coming from federal grants. But if MTPD wanted the TSA to instead be patrolling the platforms with dogs to sniff for bombs, or with behavioral profiling experts to look for people that might be about to attack the system, could they use the money for this instead?

And what's the effectiveness? Have such programs in other cities actually deterred any attacks? Did Metro have any data on the value of this kind of program versus others?

Civil liberties advocates have also asked whether these searches are looking for other items that aren't related to the actual safety of Metro. The ACLU points out that searches for "general crime control" are not permitted (and even the constitutionality of this program is doubtful).

DC will soon start to have legal medical marijuana, but that remains illegal under federal law as well as in Maryland and Virginia. What will MTPD do if a rider boarding a station in the District has marijuana? Whose laws are they obligated to enforce?

What else would you like to know? What do you think the RAC's resolution should say?

The Post reported this morning that the idea to bomb Metro came from the FBI. In other words, no terrorist (that we know of) actually was planning to hit Metro. The FBI could easily have suggested any other target. If they had suggested Ben's Chili Bowl, would we now be talking about the need to beef up security in half-smoke shops?

This is the typical pattern of reacting to security risks. As security expert Bruce Schneier frequently explains, we focus on ways to stop the most recent attack, instead of trying to determine what future attacks will look like. This seems to even hold true if the target was picked by law enforcement instead of by any actual potential terrorists.

It's great that the FBI ran the sting. Clearly, If the allegations are true, Farooque Ahmed really did want to cause harm to Americans, and by organizing this fake plot, they were able to steer his destructive desires in a way that allowed them to arrest him. I'm really glad they got him. But anyone that thinks this is evidence of a risk to Metro isn't paying attention.

Meanwhile, Metro is telling riders to be vigilant. Having average, untrained citizens report people who look odd is only proven to increase the number of useless reports. It will probably waste a lot of resources that could go to training undercover officers who could patrol stations and actually find threats.

There are terrorists out there. We need to catch them. The government should spend lots of money hiring good FBI investigators to find them, like they did here. I feel safer knowing the FBI caught a terrorist. I wouldn't feel safer by having my bag searched or seeing guards standing at the entrance to every station. I know it's hard, but Metro needs to respond based on the best way to actually prevent an attack, not the best way to simply look like they are.

Update: Commenter jcm noted that members of the public did alert police to the smoking truck in the foiled Times Square plot. That's true, and people should be paying attention to their surroundings, though after the Times Square plot there was a huge rash of false alarms. The research I was citing mainly applies to people; ordinary citizens are not good at differentiating someone who seems nervous because they're running late from someone who is about to blow up something. Instead, they typically just end up being suspicious of people who look Muslim.

Before the age of suburban development and private shopping mall, cities always included grand public spaces for relaxation and socializing. Sometimes these spaces were formal, grassy parks and sometimes these places were paved plazas like the piazzas in Italy.

Unlike private shopping malls, which serve as the de facto gathering places in most suburbs, public streets, squares, and parks in cities are by their virtue open to the public. With the bright lights, movie theaters, restaurants, and ample seating space on the steps of the museum, Chinatown is a unique attraction for nightlife of all ages. The fact that it sits atop three Metro lines makes it accessible and a convenient meeting place for people coming from all over the city.

Criminal behavior and ill-behaved teenagers do reduce the enjoyment of the space for everyone else, including the vast majority of well-behaved teenagers. This must be addressed through police patrols; Chinatown's popularity and importance warrants a continuous MPD presence the way the NYPD constantly patrols Times Square.

Even still, public spaces by definition are open to the public and must remain that way. Part of the charm of Chinatown is that it is unpredictable and boisterous. Its liveliness, let's remember, is largely owed to the liveliness of excited, but law-abiding, youth.

Just as teens skateboarded in Silver Spring's plaza because they had no better place, if young people are hanging out in Gallery Place, the better approach would be to give them a better place to go that meets their needs instead of just trying to annoy them away somewhere else.

More importantly, this device probably violates the law.

The DC Human Rights Act makes it illegal "to deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodations." (Our emphasis)

Unequal treatment is illegal if it is "wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of residence or business of any individual." (Our emphasis)

Whoever installed this device clearly did so with the intention of driving away young people who have an equal right to be at the Metro entrance. The device's manufacturer doesn't mask the age-discrimination motivation of the Mosquito and even markets it as "a simple, safe and benign way to disperse crowds of anti-social youth." There's no explanation as to how the device knows who is "anti-social" and who isn't. Few people would describe a toddler or infant as "anti-social", but the device doesn't care for such nuance.

The ethical problem with the device is clear: it purposely aims to annoy and deny equal use of public accommodations to law-abiding people solely on account of their age. All insidious forms of discrimination derive from desire to withhold one's goodwill from a person for characteristics that don't merit distinction.

Several papers are reporting the installation, but few are addressing the civil rights aspect of it. Young people are equally entitled to use these public places lawfully and social interaction in the public sphere is a key part of urban life, even if it occasionally gets rowdy. Police patrols are a more effective means of maintaining order in Chinatown as they can address activities that are actually illegal.

The developer probably doesn't care much for the ethics of the matter, but the DC Human Rights Act makes its use illegal. An investigation by the city's Office of Human Rights is a call the developer will hear loudly.